This paper incorporates identity into a model of voluntary public good contribution. An ideal of contributing to public goods divides players to di¤erent social categories: Players who identify with the ideal become insiders, obtaining identity utility but incurring disutility if their contributions depart from the ideal, while players who do not identify with the ideal remain as outsiders. We show that identity could increase public good contribution; the ideal that best resolves the free-riding problem in the public good game equals either the contribution level of the most altruistic player in the absence of the identity, or a level that makes the least altruistic player indi¤erent between becoming an insider and not, depending on the size of the group. These results have implications for social policymaking.
Introduction
People in the society divide themselves into di¤erent social categories. Different social categories entail di¤erent norms. Social categorization and the associated norms in ‡uence behavior. Taking the issue of climate change for example, there are so-called climate alarmists and climate skeptists (or climate denialists). The former group accepts the existence of anthropogenic climate change while the latter group denies it. While people skeptical of climate change refuse to take actions on it, people who believe in anthropogenic climate change have started to engage in an emerging lifestyle called low carbon living in an attempt to curb the climate change. Kotchen and Moore (2008) show that environmentalists are more likely to voluntarily restrain their consumption of goods and services that generate negative externalities. Kahn (2007) …nd that those who vote for "green policies" and register for liberal/environmentalist political parties indeed live a "green" lifestyle by commuting by public transit more often, purchasing more hybrid vehicles, and consuming less gasoline than non-environmentalists. While Costa and Kahn (2010) note that liberals and environmentalists are more energy e¢ -cient than conservatives, which makes it harder for them to further reduce energy consumption, in a recent paper, Costa and Kahn (2013) …nd that popular electricity conservation "nudge"of providing feedback to households on own and peers'home electricity usage is much more e¤ective with political liberals/environmentalists than with conservatives. These two authors provide an identity story to explain this asymmetry: the ideologies that people accept not only a¤ect the policies they vote for, but also in ‡uence behavior at the individual level. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) …rstly study the role of identity in economics. Identity means a person's sense of self. In their model, an individual has the sense of belonging to a certain social category; the social category then prescribes what should be done, or ideals. These prescriptions or ideals become behavioral targets or goals for people in the social category. In their utility function, Akerlof and Kranton introduce identity utility that depends on which social category the individual identi…es with, the prescription of the social category, and the individual's characteristics related to the prescription. They and follow-up studies (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton, 2002 , 2005 , Hiller and Verdier, 2014 use the identity model to analyze behavior in the workplace, the school and the family, to further understandings on discrimination, poverty, labor division, corporate culture, and other topics. In these models, however, the ideals prescribed by social categories are assumed to be …xed. 1 The evidence discussed above demonstrates that identity plays an important role in issues involving externalities as well. Energy conservation provides a public good to every member in the society in the sense that it reduces Greenhouse Gas emissions to the atmosphere. The fundamental dif…culty in a public good problem is that free riding incentives typically cause under-provision of the public good. A question is, is the promotion of the "green" lifestyle conducive to the public good provision? The low carbon movement advocates the "green" lifestyle, exempli…ed by the Nobel Peace Prize winner Al Gore and his movie An Inconvenient Truth. Environmentalists who accept this idea seem to practice it by themselves, as shown by Kahn (2007) . However, the fervent environmental campaigns also generate their enemies: the climate denialists heavily and routinely attack the low carbon movement (see, the Climate Depot, a climate denialist website, for instance). Although psychologists and management scientists argue that persuasion strategies or "nudges" may be useful in changing people's behavior (e.g. Thaler Costa and Kahn (2013) show that they are useful only for those who identify with the ideology embedded in the nudges. The goals or norms provided by one social category have little impact on people who do not belong to that social category.
In this paper, we develop an economic model to study the role of identity in public good contributions. The questions we investigate include the following. Why does the promotion of certain ideals (prescriptions) have asymmetric e¤ects on di¤erent groups of people? How do people sort themselves into di¤erent social categories? Is it true that the higher the ideals are, the better? Or are there optimal ideals that best resolve the free riding problem in public good games? Finally and more generally, to what extent would identity help in public good games?
We consider a game of voluntary public good provision. Players are heterogenous in their degrees of altruism. The players …rst decide on whether to identify with an ideal of contributing to a public good. Those who identify with the ideal become insiders while those who reject the ideal stay as outsiders. By this way, the ideal divides players into two social categories: insiders and outsiders. Being an insider gives the player an identity utility; however, departing from the ideal will entail a utility loss. Insiders and outsiders then privately contribute to the public good.
Our model provides the following answers to the questions above. The ideal of public good contribution only a¤ects the behavior of the insiders, who identify with it. Ideals should not be too high: A very high ideal fails to attract insiders and thus cannot be e¤ective. The ideal that maximizes the expected level of public good contribution is either the level of public good contribution of the most altruistic person in the absence of identity, or the level that makes the least altruistic person indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting it, depending on the size of the group. In the former case, players who are su¢ ciently altruistic become insiders while the others stay as outsiders, while in the latter case, all the players identify with the ideal. Overall, identity is helpful in resolving the free-riding problem by increasing the level of public good provision.
Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) consider moral motivation in public good provision, where the moral goal originates from individuals' introspection based on some absolute laws in the sense of Immanuel Kant. In our paper, as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000) , the ideal is more of a social norm derived from outside, rather than a moral norm; depending on whether people identify with it or not, people sort themselves into di¤erent social categories. Andreoni (1990) and Holländer (1990) consider warm glow and social approval, respectively, as byproducts of contributing to a public good. There is no social categorization in these studies. Rege (2004) endogenizes the strength of social approvals by studying the interactions among contributors and non-contributors.
There is accumulated empirical evidence that demonstrates the role of identity in public good provision. For instances, Burlando and Hey (1997), Benjamin, Choi and Fisher (2010), Solow and Kirkwood (2002) , and Croson, Marks and Snyder (2003) …nd the e¤ects of national, religious, social and gender identities on public good contribution. Our paper, to our knowledge, is the …rst theoretical economic study on identity in a public good contribution game.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, Section 3 derives the ideal that maximizes the expected level of public good contribution, while Section 4 concludes. The Appendix contains proofs.
The model
Consider a group of N players. We will assume that the group is su¢ ciently large in Inequality (8) below. Each player makes voluntary contribution to a public good, which can be interpreted as emission abatement in the application of environmental protection. Let a i denote player i's contribution, for any i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g. The marginal bene…t of the public good to each player is normalized to 1. The private cost of providing a i is c 2 a 2 i , for each player. From the social point of view, the e¢ cient provision of the public good would entail, N = ca i , where the social marginal bene…t equals the private marginal cost of contributing to the public good, implying each player contributing N c . Hammond (1987) characterizes altruism and discusses its relevance in public good provision. In our model, players are altruistic in the sense that they partially internalize the bene…t of their own contribution to others. Player i has an altruism parameter i in the objective function, which captures the relative weight of others'bene…t compared to her own bene…t from her contribution. We assume that i follows a uniform distribution between 0; , where 0 < < 1.
Let n N 1, the number of other players. In a baseline model without identity, any player i chooses a i to maximize the following:
With the inverse U-shaped quadratic objective function, the First Order Condition gives the solution to this problem:
where superscript b indicates the baseline case, and we de…ne A i 1 + i n. Equation (2) implies that a b i increases in i and n, and decreases in c.
The Model with Identity
This subsection considers the model with identity. Identity originates from an ideal level of contributing to the public good, denoted by a . 2 Whether or not players identify with this ideal sorts players into two social categories: insiders and outsiders. Insiders identify with the ideal while outsiders reject it. Following Akerlof and Kranton (2002), we assume that an insider obtains an identity utility (of being an insider) V , but incurs a utility loss of 2 (a i a ) 2 by deviating her contribution from the ideal. 3 An outsider does not change her preference with the ideal.
Being an insider gives a player a sense of belonging and a feeling of a¤ec-tions. We condense these psychological e¤ects into one measure, the utility gain from identity. Implicitly, we have normalized the identity utility of be-ing an outsider to 0. Alternatively, V can be interpreted as the di¤erence in identity utilities between an insider and an outsider. We further assume that V is su¢ ciently large:
Identi…cation with the ideal makes an insider feel bad, if her contribution deviates from the ideal. This utility loss is increasing in the gap between her own contribution and the ideal behavior, and the marginal disutility is also increasing in the absolute value of this gap. 4 The parameter > 0 captures how an insider is concerned about the deviation of her contribution from the ideal, given the gap between her contribution and the ideal. We will say it measures the "insider concern". The game proceeds as follows.
In stage 1, each player decides on whether to identify with the ideal a (and become an insider) or not.
In stage 2, each player (either an insider or an outsider) decides on her public good contribution.
As usual, we will solve the game backwards.
Public good contribution game
We start with stage 2. Since identity does not a¤ect the preference of an outsider, an outsider j with j contributes to the public good following Equation (2) 
Again, the objective function is inverse U-shaped quadratic, so the First Order Condition is su¢ cient for the solution:
) a
where the superscript i indicates insiders. We observe that a i i is increasing in i , n, and the ideal a , while decreasing in c. Less obvious is its relation with : da
implying that the insider concern increases an insider's public good contribution if and only if the ideal is higher than the insider's public good contribution in the absence of identity.
, the change of public good contribution after a player becomes an insider. Thus,
We have the following lemma, showing that an insider makes more public good contribution than that in the absence of identity, if and only if the ideal is higher than the insider's public good contribution in the absence of identity.
This result is directly derived from Equation (6).
Identity game
We now move back to stage 1, the identity game. For player i, the utility of staying as an outsider is, the bene…t of public good contribution from others, which is exogenous (and …xed) to the player, plus the following,
while the utility of becoming an insider is, the exogenous bene…t of public good contribution from others, plus
We have
where B 2V c(c+ ) 1=2
. The appendix shows the derivation of the equivalence in (7). Let (a ) 1 + ca B n ;
and
Taking into account the constraint 0 i , and by the tie-breaking assumption that a player being indi¤erent would choose to be an insider, we have the following lemma regarding the condition under which players choose to be insiders.
Lemma 2 Players with
choose to be insiders, while the other players choose to be outsiders.
Inequality (3) implies that B > 1. This guarantees that, for any a > 0, + (a ) > 0. 5 We further assume that
We now discuss the implication of Lemma 2, by considering two possibilities: (I) a su¢ ciently large group, n 2 B, and (II) a small enough group, n < 2 B.
, implying that the interval
is not longer than the interval 0; . Depending on the value of a , Lemma 2 implies the following cases in Table 1 .I.
Case a (a ) ; Table 1 .I: The range of i for becoming insiders, with n 2 B
The domain of a in the second column of Table 1 .I implies the relative magnitudes of (a ), + (a ), 0, and in the third column, while the last column indicates the corresponding range of i for which players choose to be insiders. Table 1 .I shows that when the group is su¢ ciently large (n 2 B), with a low a , less altruistic players identify with a but more altruistic players choose to be outsiders; with an intermediate a , players with moderate 5 If Inequality (3) does not hold, then + (a ) may be negative, in which case no player becomes an insider and the ideal has no e¤ect at all. degree of altruism choose to be insiders while players with low or high degree of altruism stay out; with an even higher a , only su¢ ciently altruistic players choose to be insiders; if a is too high, however, every player stays out and the ideal is not e¤ective.
(II) When n < 2 B; then + (a ) (a ) > , implying that the interval [ (a ) ; + (a )] is longer than the interval 0; . Depending on the value of a , Lemma 2 implies the following cases in Table 1 .II.
Case a (a ) ; Table 1 .II: The range of i for becoming insiders, with n < 2 B Table 1 .II shows that when the group size is small enough (n < 2 B), with a low a , more altruistic players choose to be outsiders; with an intermediate a , every player identi…es with it; with an even higher a , only su¢ ciently altruistic players choose to be insiders; but if a is too high, no player wants to be an insider. Overall, the ideal a a¤ects which of the players would become insiders, and the contribution levels of insiders. We will analyze how the choice of a a¤ects total public good contribution in the next section.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the choice of the ideal, a . Suppose that there is a social manager who wants to resolve the free-riding problem and alleviate the underprovision of the public good. The social manager could be a politician, an educator, or a religious leader. Through some mechanisms (e.g. media, school, church), the social manager is able to in ‡uence or control a . Then the question is, how would the social manager choose a ?
To answer this question, we add a prior stage, stage 0, to the above game, in which the social manager chooses a . We assume that for any i, j 2 f1; 2; :::; N g, i and j are independently and identically distributed, and that the i 's (for any i 2 f1; 2; :::; N g) are not realized until stage 1, so the social manager only knows the distribution of i during her decision-making.
In stage 0, a social manager decides on a to maximize the expected level of public good contribution.
From the standpoint of stage 0, denote the expected e¤ect of a on the public good contribution of a player by g (a ). Recall that the ideal will have no impact on outsiders. Therefore, we have
where Pr(Insiderja ) is the probability of the player becoming an insider given a and E i ( i jInsider; a ) is the expectation of (A i ) conditional on the player being an insider and a . The function g (a ) thus measures, by expectation, to what extent a would increase public good contribution for a player. We …rst have the following lemma. Tables 1.I and 1 .II), the ideal has a zero e¤ect on the expected level of public good contribution. The intuitions are as follows. When the ideal is low, it back…res as it discourages (at least some) insiders from public good contribution. When a is very high, it fails to attract any insiders, so it has no impact on public good contribution.
Lemma 3 implies that the social manager would choose an ideal that is reasonably high but not too high. Given this, the ideal level that maximizes public good contribution depends on the following tradeo¤: A higher ideal encourages insiders to contribute more (i.e., increases the intensive margin) but attracts less insiders (i.e. decreases the extensive margin). We then have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (i) a = 1+max(n ;B) c maximizes g (a ); (ii) when n < B,
, and when n B, g
, which falls into the Case (II.ii) in Table 1 .II, where it makes (a ) = 0. By Inequality (7), (a ) = 0 means that a player with i = 0 is indi¤erent between becoming an insider and remaining outside. 6 In this case, every player in the group chooses to be an insider. When B < n , a = . Therefore, Proposition 1 implies that when the group is su¢ ciently small (n B ), the concern on the extensive margin dominates, and the ideal that maximizes expected public good contribution makes the least altruistic player indi¤erent between being an insider and an outsider, so that all players choose to be insiders, and the ideal increases expected contribution to the public good by
per player. When the group is large enough (n > B ), the concern on the intensive margin dominates, and the ideal that maximizes public good contribution equals the contribution of the most altruistic player in the absence of identity, to encourage contribution from insiders; with this ideal, only su¢ ciently altruistic players become insiders, and the ideal increases expected contribution to the public good by V n per player.
Note that a = 1+max(n ;B) c brings a Pareto improvement to the case without identity. We have a = 1+max(n ;B) c
by Lemma 1, this ideal increases the public good contribution of every insider compared to the baseline case without identity. Compared to the baseline case, outsiders are better o¤ because they enjoy more bene…ts from the higher contributions of insiders, while they do not change their own contributions. 6 We can verify this by observing that u Insiders are (at least weakly) better o¤ from identifying with the ideal than being an outsider, since they could have stayed outside. Given the fact that outsiders are better o¤ than in the baseline case, insiders are thus also better o¤ compared to the baseline case. Overall, both insiders and outsiders are better o¤ from a = 1+max(n ;B) c than in the baseline case without identity. Meanwhile, the ideal in Proposition 1 does not cause overprovision of the public good, from the purely economic (materialistic) point of view. Recall that when a i = N c , the social marginal (material) bene…t of public good provision, N , equals the private marginal cost, ca i . With the ideal a = 1+max(n ;B) c , any insider's contribution to the public good is still lower than
, because by Equation (4),
where in the last step we make use of < 1 and B < n = N 1.
We have shown that the ideal level in Proposition 1 maximizes the expected contribution to public goods, leads to a Pareto improvement, and does not cause overprovision of public goods. Proposition 1 has important implications on how should the social manager set an ideal to enhance public good contribution. It is not the case that the higher the ideal is, the better it is. A higher ideal motivates an insider to contribute more to the public good (by Equation (4)), but discourages players from becoming an insider. Note that the ideal level in Proposition 1 is also lower than This result is in line with everyday observations. In well-functioning organizations, managers do not set unreal ideals. Instead, they may set an ideal that most (if not all) of the members …nd realistic enough and would like to accept, or may just take the best real-world exemplars as the ideal.
7 Proposition 1 …ts these observations. Moreover, in the climate change application, our result implies that if the advocates of low carbon movements set up a very high target on "green living", many people would turn to be climate skeptists or even denialists.
The following remark presents some results of comparative statics.
Remark 1 (i) If n < B , the ideal maximizing expected contribution to public
, is increasing in V and decreasing in c and .
(ii) If n B , the ideal maximizing expected public good contribution,
, is increasing in n and , and decreasing in c; under this ideal, players with i B n become insiders, so the expected proportion of insiders
, which increases in V , c, and decreases in , and n.
A higher marginal cost of contribution requires a lower ideal to counterbalance, so the ideal maximizing public good contribution is lower with a higher c; as a result, when the group size is so large that only su¢ ciently altruistic players become insiders, the expected proportion of insiders becomes larger with a higher c, since the ideal goes down. Parameters V and represent the bene…t (identity utility) and cost (identity concern) of accepting the ideal respectively. Therefore, the ideal maximizing contribution is increasing in V and decreasing in when the group size is small, and the expected proportion of players accepting the ideal is increasing in V and decreasing in when the group size is large. When the group size is large enough such that less altruistic players choose to be outsiders, an increase in the average level of altruism ( 2 ) or the group size (representing the extent of positive externality from the public good) increases the ideal that maximizes contribution, which eventually causes a smaller expected proportion of insiders. Consequently, the expected increase of per player public good contribution from the ideal, compared to the baseline case, is lower with larger n , as implied by part (ii) of Proposition 1.
Finally, the following remark shows how identity changes the disparity in public good contribution among players.
Remark 2 (i) For any a and any
(ii) If n B , under the ideal in Proposition 1, for
Part (i) of Remark 2 is straightforward from Equations (2) and (4). It suggests that identity reduces the gap in public good contribution for insiders. If n B , under the ideal that maximizes public good contribution a = 1+n c , players with j (a ) become insiders while players with i < (a ) stay outside. In this case, Part (ii) of the remark suggests that identity increases the gap in public good contribution between insiders and outsiders. This is directly from the fact that every player identifying with the ideal increases her contribution, while outsiders choose the same level of contribution as that without identity. This result is also in line with the asymmetric e¤ects of energy conservation "nudges"on di¤erent social categories, as reported by Costa and Kahn (2013) . The "nudges"are useful only with insiders (political liberals/environmentalists) but not outsiders (political conservatives), as the latter group does not identify with the ideology embedded in the nudges; as a result, such "nudges"enlarge the gap in energy use between the two groups of people.
Conclusion
With free riding incentives, voluntary contribution to public goods typically falls short of e¢ ciency. In this paper we study how identity can be used to in ‡uence voluntary public good contribution. There exists ideal behavior regarding contribution to public goods. Depending on whether to identify with this ideal, players become insiders or outsiders. Insiders obtain identity utility from being insiders, but incur utility loss if their contributions deviate from the ideal. Identity thus a¤ects the public good contribution of insiders.
Although the society has a complicated process, through di¤erent mechanisms, in generating the ideal, social managers, politicians, teachers, and religious leaders may in ‡uence the ideal, through public policies, media, school, and church. We derive the ideal level that maximizes the expected level of public good contribution: it equals either the contribution level of the most altruistic player in the absence of identity, or the level that makes the least altruistic player indi¤erent between accepting the ideal and not, depending on which level is higher. We show that this ideal is a Pareto improvement; it increases the expected level of public good contribution to the largest extent but does not cause overcontribution. Therefore, the ideal level is optimal in view of resolving the free-riding problem in voluntary public good contributions. We also …nd that identity increases the gap in public good contribution between insiders and outsiders, but reduces the gap within insiders. Case (I): n 2 B. When
